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Abstract
The Limits of International Law received a great deal of criticism when it was
published in 2005, but it has aged well. The skeptical, social-scientific methodology that it
recommended has become a normal mode of international law scholarship. And the dominant
idealistic view of international law that the book criticized is today in shambles, unable to explain
the turmoil in international politics. This Essay reflects on the book’s reception and corrects
common misperceptions of its arguments.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Our book, The Limits of International Law1 (Limits), was published fifteen years
ago. A lot has happened since then, both in international law scholarship, and in
the world. Here we take a brief retrospective look at Limits, its critics, and the arc
of international law scholarship and international law since its publication.

II. O RIGINS
The collaboration that resulted in Limits began many years before
publication, in 1998. That year we wrote A Theory of Customary International Law, 2
which we published in 1999, and (after revision) incorporated into chapter 1 of
Limits. The late 1990s was the high-water mark of American exceptionalism and
optimism about prospects for a benign international liberal order. This optimism
had seeped into mainstream public international law scholarship, and especially
American international law scholarship.
As Limits noted, that scholarship was an improbable combination of idealism
and doctrinalism.3 The idealism was reflected in the conviction that international
law was powerful, expanding, and liberal in orientation. The doctrinalism was
manifest in the traditional lawyerly practice of parsing legal “texts”—treaties,
judicial decisions, government declarations, and so on—to discern legal
obligations. The improbability of this combination arose from the tension
between those texts, associated state practice, and the idealism. The texts tended
to display either exceedingly narrow compromises hammered out by states that
jealously guarded their interests, or florid rhetoric that expressed aspirations for a
better future that most states plainly did not take seriously as binding
commitments in the here-and-now. Meanwhile, numerous violations of
international law at the time—and, more frequently, circumventions that revealed
the narrowness of the actual commitments—were downplayed, explained away,
or bemoaned. These were the currents of thought that we reacted to, first in the
1999 article,4 then in two other journal articles,5 and then in the book.6
Mainstream public international law scholarship of the time had not yet
caught up with developments in scholarship in American law schools. In the
1

JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).

2

Eric A. Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113
(1999).

3

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 3.
Posner & Goldsmith, supra note 2.

4
5

6

Eric A. Posner & Jack L. Goldsmith, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (2000); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral
and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S115 (2002).
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1.
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1970s, legal scholarship welcomed influences from other disciplines—including
economics, history, philosophy, sociology, and psychology. By the 1990s, legal
scholarship had been transformed. Most influential scholarship became firmly
grounded in the methodology of the social sciences. While economics was the
dominant social scientific discipline in and out of law, the transformation was
broader than that. Legal scholars took from the social sciences a commitment to
theory and empiricism even while they maintained their traditional normative
policy orientation, which the social sciences, for the most part, had shunned.
“Theory” meant that legal scholarship connected its normative claims to a
recognizable, in-principle-testable theory about how people behave. In law and
economics, the theory was that people act in an instrumentally rational way, based
on stable preferences and subject to a budget constraint. “Empiricism” meant that
legal scholars would look beyond the law as it appears in statutes and judicial
opinions and evaluate how it influences behavior. In large part, law and economics
drew on the empirical results in economics. But it also claimed that its normative
proposals for legal reform would have certain predicted outcomes that could be
empirically validated. And “normative” meant that legal scholarship made
proposals for reform or defended existing arrangements. There was a huge
amount of debate about the appropriate normative criteria.7 While there was not
as much convergence as one might have hoped, legal scholars did make progress
by being clearer about their normative assumptions and standards.

III. L IMIT S
Limits was a broadside against these prevailing attitudes in international law
scholarship. In place of the idealism of international law scholarship, we sought
to approach the topic with the more skeptical style of thinking about institutions
that we associated with the social science tradition.
We were not writing on a clean slate. In the field of international trade law,
law and economics ideas had already made an impact.8 In political science,
scholars who called themselves “rational institutionalists” (and similar things) had
begun to apply economic theory to international institutions and law, albeit with
a focus and approach that were somewhat foreign to the style of legal scholarship. 9
7

8

9

Law and economics mostly used efficiency as its chief normative criterion. In recent years, scholars
have become more interested in distributional equity as well. In other areas of law, various other
normative criteria drawn from political and moral philosophy were common. See Zachary Liscow,
Redistribution for Realists (Yale L. Sch., Working Paper, Feb. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/FU4ZKDDC.
See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1999).
See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation
and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923, (1985); Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane
& Anne-Marie Slaughter, Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385 (2000).
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Other methodologies in international relations theory were also beginning to
influence international law scholarship.10 And some international law professors
had begun to think about ways that law and economics could be imported into
international law.11 Little of this work focused on big-picture theoretical questions
about how public international law operated. And little of it focused on the
incentive-compatibility issue—the issue of how states’ incentives might affect
their compliance with international law, and hence their design of international
law. Much of the brouhaha about Limits resulted from our placement of this
question—which recalled the tradition of realism in international relations—at the
center of the study of public international law.
For theory, Limits drew on economics and game theory. While there was
nothing particularly sophisticated about our approach, we could not simply draw
on standard law and economics, which was mostly applied to domestic law,
because of a distinctive feature of international law—namely, decentralized
enforcement. Because one cannot assume a relatively neutral and reliable central
enforcer of international law, as one can for domestic law, the incentives of
enforcers (states) to comply with, as well as make, international law must be
accounted for. That is why we used the theory of repeated games. The
requirement that international law be “incentive-compatible”—that is, consistent
with the interests of states—puts a significant limit on what international law
could accomplish, compared to domestic law, where centuries of institutional
development made possible laws and regulations that could advance broader
conceptions of the public good.12
The central claim in Limits was that international law—treaties and
customs—emerges from and is sustained by states acting rationally to maximize
their interests given their perception of the interests of other states and the
distribution of state power. This was a self-consciously reductive claim based on
reductive assumptions. The goal was to see how much of macro behavior related
to international law could be explained not on the basis of the field’s standard
assumptions about a tendency toward law compliance, but rather on the basis of
simple assumptions about state interests and rudimentary tools of game theory.
In the introduction to Limits we discussed some of our simplifying
assumptions. While acknowledging that a rational choice theory of international
law could, in theory, be built based on assessments of the interests of citizens or
10

11

12

See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, International Law and
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367
(1998).
See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1 (1999); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law, (John M. Olin Program in
L. and Econ., Working Paper No. 216, 2004).
See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009).
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domestic institutions, we chose the state as the unit of analysis primarily because
that is the unit upon which most of international law operates. In doing so, we
followed mainstream practice in economics and political science, which treated
states—as well as other collective entities, like corporations, households, political
parties, and government agencies—as individual agents for purposes of analysis.
We also acknowledged that a state’s interest—in this context, its preferences over
international outcomes—was often difficult to discern or contested. Our theory
assumed that a state’s interest was reflected in the preferences of its leaders. This
assumption “is a simplification and is far from perfect,” we noted, but we
embraced it nonetheless “because a state's political leadership, influenced by
numerous inputs, determines state actions related to international law.”13
Limits was agnostic about the content of a state’s interest with one important
exception: we formally excluded a preference for complying with international
law. We did not claim that leaders and their citizens lack a preference for
complying with international law. We noted that this was “an empirical question
that we do not purport to resolve in this book.”14 We excluded this preference
primarily for methodological reasons. One was that we were exploring how robust
a theory of international law one could develop without relying on this prevailing
dogma. Second, as we noted, it “[i]s unenlightening to explain international law
compliance in terms of a preference for complying with international law,” which
tells one “nothing interesting about when and why states act consistently with
international law and provides no basis for understanding variation in, and
violation of, international law.”15
On these assumptions, we crafted a theory that sought to explain the
behaviors associated with international law. Here is the theory in a nutshell:
International law refers to equilibrium outcomes in games of cooperation and
coordination among rational, self-interested states. In some cases, these
outcomes emerge in a decentralized way as states act in reciprocal fashion in
order to obtain mutual gains. “Customary international law” is the term used
to refer to the resulting rules of behavior. Because decentralized norms are
often ambiguous, states also either codify customary international law in
treaties or draft treaties to address novel problems that customary
international law does not address. International law can be, and often is,
effective and stable because once cooperation begins, it is in the rational selfinterest of states to maintain it. But international law can be, and often is,
violated, as the relative power of states changes, the preferences of states
change, and new problems arise. Often violations are avoided as states
anticipate them and renegotiate their obligations; at other times, they occur,
sometimes on massive scale. International law may be normatively desirable
for the simple reason that it facilitates mutual gains across states. But it need
13

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 6.

14

Id. at 10.
Id.

15
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not be: states frequently act in predatory fashion, and can use international
law to entrench normatively undesirable outcomes.16

Parts I and II of Limits applied this framework to various rules of customary
international law and various treaty and related regimes. We made several general
claims, including: bilateral cooperation was more robust than multilateral
cooperation; seeming multilateral cooperation in multilateral treaty organizations
was best understood as a combination of coordination and pairwise cooperation;
customary international law is more fragile than treaties; and ratification
procedures can facilitate cooperation. We did our best to use qualitative empirical
evidence to support our theoretical claims, or to show how they could be
supported.
With respect to normative issues, we imported the efficiency criterion of law
and economics while expressing skepticism toward the traditional normative
commitments of mainstream international law scholarship. We took seriously the
diversity of populations (and thus interests) across states rather than assume that
deep down, everyone is an American liberal or a European social democrat. We
also made two normative claims extraneous to law and economics: first, that states
have no moral obligation to comply with international law contrary to their
interests; and second, that the cosmopolitan claim that states have a duty to craft
international law on the basis of global rather than state welfare was incompatible
with cosmopolitans’ commitment to liberal democracy, which is designed to serve
the interests of its citizens and almost always produces a self-interested (that is,
nationalist) foreign policy.17

IV. C RITICIS MS AND S UBSEQUENT D EVELOPMENTS IN
I NTERNATIONAL L AW S CHOLARSHIP
In the fifteen years since its publication, Limits has been widely discussed
and loudly criticized. During the same period, international law scholarship
changed quite a lot—in the direction of the commitments made in Limits. Here
we focus on three major criticisms of Limits that relate to the changes in
scholarship during the period.

A. Challenges to Theory
We noted at the outset of Limits that “[o]ur approach falls closer to the
political science international relations tradition, and in particular to [rational
choice] institutionalism, than to the mainstream international law scholarship
tradition.”18 Indeed, political scientists and economists were unperturbed by the
16

See id. at 4.

17

See id. at 185–224.
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 16.

18
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claims in the book. Lacking any interest in controversies among international
lawyers, they saw little that was bothersome.19
But most legal scholars viewed the book with hostility as a radical and
unhelpful departure from prior scholarship, and as flawed on many grounds.20
Some of our critics didn’t like the rational choice framework of Limits and
dismissed it out of hand.21 Others accepted the framework, at least for purposes
of argument, but criticized our application of it. Some claimed that the state was
the wrong or incomplete unit of analysis.22 Others stated that more complicated
models would produce different and better explanations.23 Yet others said that
that our concept of state interest was too narrow, or too reductive, or too
flexible.24 Some argued that we used an impoverished notion of reputation in our
models.25 Many did not like our argument that states lacked a moral obligation to
comply with international law or to take cosmopolitan action.26

19

20

See, e.g., Stacie Goddard, Book Review, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 710, 711 (2005) (“[A]lthough political
scientists may be sympathetic to the study, most will find the argument of limited added utility.”);
cf. G. John Ikenberry, Book Review, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 150 (2005) (“This elegantly argued book . . .
has the virtues and liabilities of all simple rationalist theories.”); Todd Sandler, Treaties: Strategic
Considerations, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 155, 156 (2008) (“extend[ing] and modify[ing]” the “interesting
and useful approach” to international law in Limits).
There were exceptions. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of the Limits
of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253 (2006); David Gray, Rule-Skepticism, “Strategery,”
and the Limits of International Law, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 563 (2006).

21

See, e.g., MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER & PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS
FROM THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT (2008).

22

See, e.g., Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Book Review, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 106 (2005); David Sloss, Do
International Norms Influence State Behavior?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 159, 207 (2006); Kal
Raustiala, Refining The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 430–34 (2006);
Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 454 (2006).

23

See, e.g., ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO DIFFERENT WAYS
OF THINKING 274–75 (2017); Andreas L. Paulus, Potential and Limits of the Economic Analysis of
International Law: A View from Public International Law, 165 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 170, 176
(2009); Anne van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘The Limits of
International Law,’ 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289, 291 (2006).
See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 23, at 172; David Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is:
Goldsmith and Posner’s The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339 (2006); Sloss,
supra note 22; Edward T. Swaine, Restoring (And Risking) Interest in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L
L. 259 (2006); Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (2006); Paul Berman, Review Essay: Seeing Beyond the Limits of International
Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006).
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379 (2006).
See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 305, 309 (2006).

24

25
26
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We anticipated these criticisms in the book,27 and addressed them further in
a subsequent essay.28 Many of the criticisms were reasonable; others were
misplaced. A lot of criticisms were generic attacks on the methodology of social
science. We won’t reiterate these points here, except to make two general
comments.
First, our models were self-consciously reductive and simplifying about the
influences on state behavior related to international law. The aim was to try to
understand how much of international law can be explained in a rigorous way
based on the centuries-old view that states act on the international stage on the
basis of what the state or its leaders see as what is best for the state. Any theory
must trade off the accuracy of its assumptions in order to achieve possible
explanation. This is standard social science. Many social science-influenced
theories since Limits have made these tradeoffs in different ways. None, we think,
offer as powerful an account of how international law works with such simple
premises. But it is hard to compare different theoretical frameworks with different
theoretical and empirical focuses.
Second, international law has now definitively taken the social science turn.
As we noted in 2006, Limits was at the broadest level different from the vast
majority of international law theory that preceded it along six dimensions: (1) it
made its assumptions explicit; (2) it addressed the limitations and criticisms of its
assumptions; (3) it separated out positive from normative analysis; (4) it framed
its claims as testable hypotheses; (5) it addressed alternate hypotheses and made
an effort to weigh the evidence; and (6) it chose its case studies and other evidence
carefully.29 We “welcomed” the criticisms of Limits from within the social science
paradigm because we believed they portended improved “standards of analysis”
in international law scholarship. “If international law scholarship generally . . .
comes to embrace the standards of methodological and empirical care that the
critics demand of Limits,” we wrote, “the discipline would be significantly
improved.”30 This, in a nutshell, is what happened in the field in the intervening
fifteen years.

27

GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 23–44.

28

Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
463 (2006).

29

Id. at 466.
Id.

30

118

Vol. 22 No. 1

Limits Fifteen Years Later

Goldsmith & Posner

B. The Reality of International Law
A major criticism of Limits was its supposed claim (or implication) that
international law didn’t matter, was irrelevant, or didn’t exist.31 Many people
argued that the theory in Limits was incompatible with the existence of so much
international law, and with the state’s use of international law in international
relations.32
It is true that the book has a self-consciously skeptical tone about
international law (more about which below), and this is likely what misled or
angered some readers. But the book is not skeptical about international law in the
sense of arguing that it is a fiction or unimportant, as some realists in the political
science tradition claim,33 or that international law is not “law,” as some
philosophers have argued.34 We were (and are) not realists as that term is
commonly understood by political scientists in international relations theory, who
believe that international law has no or little importance—though some influential
realists, like Hans Morgenthau, did take international law seriously—largely
because their focus has been on broad questions of international structure and
stability rather than how states cooperate over trade, migration, and related
matters. The book’s second sentence described the claim that international law is
not “really” law as “misleading.”35 Limits is skeptical about the claims made by
international law scholars about international law, not about international law itself.
Above all, as noted, the book is skeptical about the methodological value of an
assumption that states experience “compliance pull.”36
Yet Limits asserted a robust role for international law, and for international
law negotiations, in fostering international coordination and cooperation (and in
avoiding losses from a lack of available coordination or cooperation).37 The terms
of a treaty, or of a rule of customary international law, matter quite a lot to whether
and how coordination and cooperation are achieved. The book sought to show
through theoretical argument and case studies how the behaviors associated with

31

32

33
34
35
36
37

See, e.g., JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (2008);
JOHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: HARD CHOICES FOR THE
WORLD COMMUNITY 3 (2010); Berman, supra note 24.
See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, International Law in Black and White, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285, 287
(2006); Raustiala, supra note 22, at 429; Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in
International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institution, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1995).
See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 260 (1832).
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 13.
We emphasized that it did not follow that “international law is irrelevant or unimportant or in some
sense unreal,” and indeed that international law “can play an important role in helping states achieve
mutually beneficial outcomes.” Id.
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international law (including state behaviors consistent with international law)
could be explained based on simple premises that did not require reliance on noninstrumental factors. And while we did take an instrumental approach to the
question of compliance, and thus accounted for when international law violations
took place, especially with respect to ambitious multilateral treaties, these
arguments would be meaningless if our thesis had been that international law is a
fiction.
We were not surprised by the sharp reaction to our rational choice approach
because it flew so sharply in the face of the standard orientation of the field at the
time. But we were surprised that some of the early critics questioned whether the
non-instrumental accounts of international law that we targeted even warranted a
response, and that none of them—or later critics—gave these non-instrumental
accounts a robust defense.38 We speculated at the time that “a major generational
change is underway” in which younger scholars (then) of international law had
witnessed the power of political science and economics to bring “fruitful insights
to international relations,” and had begun to pay “greater attention to the social
science virtues: methodological self-consciousness, empiricism, and theoretical
rigor.”39
And this is what has happened since. A trend that was picking up steam
before Limits was conceived, and that we drew on in part, is now the dominant
approach in international law scholarship. There has been a huge outpouring of
international law scholarship grounded in economics and game theory,40 and in
other disciplines as well, including sociology and psychology.41 But the most
remarkable transformation has come in the application of serious empirical
analysis of international law.

C. Empirical Work
Limits was mainly a theoretical and methodological book, but it backed its
claims with some case studies as well as some quantitative work in economics and
political science relating to trade and human rights. The case studies on customary

38

See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 28, at 464.

39

Id.
See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
(2007); EUGENE KONTOROVICH & FRANCESCO PARISI, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2016); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O.
SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013).

40

41

See, e.g., Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2015); Ryan Goodman
& Derek Jink, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J.
621 (2004); Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International
Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252 (2011).
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international law attracted criticism,42 and the published studies that we drew on
were vulnerable to various methodological challenges.
Since we wrote our book, there has been an explosion of quantitative
empirical work on international law. In part this has resulted from the
accumulation of publicly available data sets made possible by the internet and
other technological developments and by the development of software and other
tools that have made it easier to analyze this data. Relatedly, PhDs in the social
sciences have increasingly moved toward empirical methods because the
intellectual payoffs seem high. These developments have had a large impact on
social science scholarship, and that impact has spilled over into international law
scholarship.
In 2017, Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg wrote a 47-page paper
describing those developments.43 One can now find empirical work on
compliance and related aspects of international law in a variety of subfields,
including human rights, international trade, bilateral investment treaties,
migration, use of force, customary international law, international courts, and
international non-judicial organizations.44 This work has benefited from
collaborations between political scientists like Beth Simmons and Erik Voeten and
law professors.45 In recent years, law professors with empirical training have made
contributions on their own. Thanks to this empirical work, the role of
international law in international relations is clearer than it used to be. The work
has gone beyond the earlier issue of compliance and shed light on how
international institutions work, how states design treaties, and much else.46
This empirical work has focused on discrete treaties or international law
regimes and has not tested general theories of international law—a difficult task,
42

See, e.g., Golove, supra note 24.

43

Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 1.
See, e.g., Vera Shikhelman, Geography, Politics and Culture in the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 845 (2017); Weijia Rao, Domestic Politics and Settlement in Investor-State Arbitration
(George Mason L. and Econ. Research Paper No. 21-01, 2020); Cree Jones, Do Legal Remedies
Promote Investment? New Evidence from a Natural Experiment in the Investment Treaty Network (Univ. of
Chicago PhD Dissertation 2017); Cree Jones & Weijia Rao, Sticky BITs, 61 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357
(2020); Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, Why Countries Sign Bilateral Labor Agreements, 47 J. LEGAL
STUD. 545 (2018); Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton, Katerina Linos & Alexander Weaver, The Global
Dominance of European Competition Law Over American Antitrust Law, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
731 (2019); Adam Chilton & Katerina Linos, Preferences and Compliance with International Law,
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming); Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, International Law,
Constitutional Law, and Public Support for Torture, 3 RSCH. & POL. 1 (2016).

44

45

See Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compliance, and Change in Customary International
Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 389 (2014); Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons,
The Proof Is in the Process: Self-Reporting Under International Human Rights Treaties, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 1
(2020).

46

See generally Daniel Abebe, Adam Chilton & Tom Ginsburg, The Social Science Approach to International
Law, 22 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2021).
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to be sure. And in general, theorizing about international law has waned in the last
decade or so. This decline in theory followed and reflected trends elsewhere in
law and economics, and economics proper, as the incremental intellectual gains
from further refining existing theories diminished and empirical questions became
more interesting and pressing.

V. S KEPTICISM AND R ECENT H ISTORY
We think that sharp reaction to Limits mainly resulted from its commitment
to understanding international law as a function of national interest and the
distribution of power. While the critics who claimed that we argued that
international law does not exist were wrong, they no doubt picked up on a strong
skeptical subtext about international law and international law scholarship. That
subtext includes skepticism about:
1. The extent to which the norms of international law persist when
nations’ interests or relative power changes;
2. The strength of international law, or the capacity of decentralized
enforcement to constrain states, especially powerful states;
3. The robustness of multilateral cooperation via international law, as
opposed to bilateral treaty-making, and relatedly, the capacity of
international law to resolve major collective action problems as
opposed to bilateral disputes like border disagreements;
4. The neutrality and effectiveness of international organizations;
5. The reality of sovereign equality;
6. The normative importance of international law in the abstract, as
opposed to specific international legal regimes which, we argued, must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis;
7. The Whig-style progressive histories of international law, and
especially human rights law, which assumed that international law
inevitably expands and improves;
8. The claim that international law is necessary for international
cooperation; and
9. The claim (more common among American academics than foreign
academics) that the U.S. plays an essential role in advancing
international law.
This skepticism contrasted sharply with the dominant view of international
law at the time, which, as we noted earlier, saw international law as approximating
or approaching a domestic legal system in advanced countries.47 That view saw
47
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international law as increasingly universal (rather than bilateral), robust (rather
than fragile), taken for granted (rather than open to question), constitutionally
grounded (rather than subject to renegotiation), and teleological (rather than a
reflection of temporary political arrangements in the international plane). The
fifteen years since Limits was published have borne out our skepticism.
In fact, international law moves in cycles, with periods of enthusiasm and
advance followed by periods of decay and retrenchment. A gradual but real
development in international law and institutions in the second half of the
nineteenth century, and the early twentieth century, collapsed with World War I.
The League of Nations was followed by fascism and World War II. Another burst
of international law-making saw the creation of the United Nations, the seeds of
the human rights treaty regime, and the development of security, economic, and
financial institutions mainly in the West, but gave way to the Cold War. The postCold War enthusiasm for international law has now collapsed as well. This
collapse can be traced through a series of crises that began twenty years ago and
that are now wearisomely familiar: the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which flowered into
an ongoing conflict between the West and Al Qaeda and other violent Islamic
organizations, and a war in Afghanistan that has not yet ended; the Iraq War that
began in 2003, that has also not really ended, but rather has extended in various
ways to Syria and Iran; the financial crises that began in 2008; the ensuing global
recession; the European debt crisis that reached its peak in 2010 and 2011; the
Arab Spring and its collapse from 2010 to 2012; a refugee crisis in Europe that
began around 2015; the Brexit referendum, which threw the European Union into
turmoil in 2016; and the global pandemic and recession of 2020. These crises
accompanied and contributed to deepening popular unhappiness with
globalization and international governance, which in turn generated domestic
political upheavals as nationalist, nativist, and populist movements made inroads
on popular opinion. These movements took place both in entrenched liberal
democracies like the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy,
as well as in developing countries, like China, India, Brazil, and the Philippines,
where the commitment to liberal democracy is shakier or non-existent.
Meanwhile, the American-led international order has faced challenges from
a rising China and a newly aggressive Russia. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping,
China has suppressed democracy in Hong Kong, ratcheted up pressure on Taiwan
and in the South China Sea, increased domestic repression, committed horrific
abuses—against more than one million Uighurs in particular—and used its
economic might to expand its influence in East and Central Asia, Europe, and
Africa through the Belt and Road infrastructure initiative. Russia under Vladimir
literature was less skeptical about the efficacy of international law than the possibility that it has
unintended negative consequences, or that it reflects the interests and obsessions of elites, a theme
subsequently taken up by SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2012).
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Putin has also increased domestic repression and put pressure on its neighboring
countries by going to war in Georgia and Ukraine and using covert operations to
interfere with elections and government operations in the U.S. and other
countries.
These upheavals have had an impact on international law. The U.S. under
Trump upended the World Trade Organization (WTO) by gutting the appellate
body and sparking a global trade war.48 It remains unclear which of these moves
violate the WTO and which simply exploit its loopholes, but either way, the
weakness of the regime has been revealed. Also revealed is the extent to which
powerful nations will retreat from global trade rules that no longer serve their
interests. It is noteworthy in this regard that the Biden administration has accepted
the Trump administration’s basic critique of global trade rules and has announced
that it will take a “different” approach to “free trade agreements” that will focus
sharply on the interests of “American job[s]” and the “interests of all American
workers.”49
Whether conceived in terms of violations of international human rights
treaties or the ostensible customary international law of human rights, the last
fifteen years have witnessed a similarly broad retreat in respect for human rights.
The supposedly developing international law right to democracy that was touted
in the 1990s and early 2000s has been replaced since 2006 with fifteen straight
years of decline in democratic freedoms.50 According to Freedom House,
countries experiencing deterioration in democracy in 2020 “outnumbered those
with improvements by the largest margin recorded since the negative trend began
in 2006.” Freedom House concludes that “the long democratic recession is
deepening.”51
The U.N. Charter’s injunction to states to “refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state” has also taken a beating.52 To take only the most
obvious examples: Russia invaded Georgia, annexed Crimea, and committed a
number of assassinations in the West. China ceaselessly threatens Taiwan and
asserts its territorial will in the South China Sea (in part through ignoring a ruling
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by a tribunal constituted under the Law of the Sea treaty).53 The territorial integrity
and political independence of many Middle Eastern nations—most notably
Yemen and Syria—are regularly violated. Other examples include the great power
fight for control of the U.N.-sanctioned destruction of Libya, the war between
Ethiopia and the Tigray Region, and clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan
over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. There have been many other
cross-border conflicts in the last fifteen years. And perhaps most significantly, the
U.S. has so broadly expanded the “self-defense” exception to the prohibition on
the use of force in the last fifteen years that it now swallows the “rule.”54
Limits did not predict these developments. But it did provide tools for
understanding them. The book warned that international law that depended on
the collective action of numerous states was fragile and devoted two chapters to
explaining that the international trade and human rights systems were vulnerable
for this reason. It also argued that when particular rules of international law stop
reflecting the interests of powerful states—either as a result of shifts in power
across states, or changing perceptions of national interest—violations will occur,
and the law itself will change. That seems to be happening as China and Russia
reassert their security interests, China gains power through economic growth,
opponents of international economic cooperation obtain influence in various
states, and governments rethink the value and limitations of human rights and free
trade commitments in response to internal religious, security, and economic
pressures.
Mainstream public international law scholarship from the 1990s, which was
oriented toward explaining the growth and spread of international law, is not in a
strong position to explain its contraction. Many international law scholars have
blamed the backlash against international law on populism. There is certainly
evidence for this view—and for the view that the neo-liberal elements of
international law contributed to this backlash. In many notable cases, a state’s
refusal to comply with a legal norm can be traced to the demands of a domestic
populist movement.55 But the question is what to make of this evidence. For
traditional public international law scholars, the temptation is to see the backlash
as the result of a temporary eruption of irrationality. Populism is not just normal
politics but collective self-delusion that has no lasting effect. Or, at best, as
political tactics—mere rhetoric—that will have no effect over the long term.56 On
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this view, the solution is to preserve valuable international institutions while riding
out the wave of populism until it crests.57
By contrast, the view of Limits was that we should expect international law
to change and even regress as power relations and the interests of states change.
States’ interests, of course, must be determined through domestic political
institutions, and populism characteristically arises when a substantial group of
people believe that those institutions disregard their values and interests. That is
what has happened as people in many western countries have lost confidence in
their governments as a result of economic stagnation and other perceived political
failures—including failures associated with international institutions like the
WTO. Their distrust of their own governments and elites carries over to
international institutions and elites as well. On this view, the backlash against
international law is rational even if unfortunate.58
We do not mean to suggest, and do not believe, that all of international law
is in decline. A huge amount of (mostly unstudied, mostly bilateral) international
law continues to foster cooperation and coordination in normal ways. Our point
is that one cannot understand the massive changes in and non-compliance with
major international law instruments alongside this persistent lower-level
cooperation through the lens of traditional public international law scholarship.
Another trend in the last fifteen years that Limits provides the tools to
understand is the notable decline in the use of binding international instruments
and a rise in the use of “non-binding” political commitments to foster
international cooperation. This is true for large-scale, ambitious international
efforts, such as the Iran deal and components of the Paris Agreements, and for
less ambitious forms of regulatory cooperation. Political commitments are a
puzzle for traditional international law scholarship because they lack the fairy dust
of “legal obligation” that supposedly induces compliance. But they are not a
puzzle for Limits. Indeed, the book began its explanation of binding international
agreements with an explanation of why states used non-binding political
commitments so often and how they succeed.59
The basic answer is that non-legal agreements can set the terms for (and thus
help achieve) self-enforcing coordination of cooperation among nations without
ratification and legal obligation. For us, the puzzle was not how are political
commitments possible, but rather: “If states can cooperate using nonlegal
instruments, why do they ever enter into treaties governed by international law?”60
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We outlined three possibilities: (1) domestic ratification processes that attend
binding agreements convey important information about state preferences for the
agreement; (2) binding agreements implicate certain interpretive default rules; and
(3) binding agreements by convention signal a more serious commitment than
nonlegal agreements. We doubt that these three explanations are exhaustive. The
point is that any theory of international law must explain how cooperation via
non-binding instruments works and must have an account of what, if anything,
legalization adds.

VI. C ONCLUSION
International law scholarship, even more than international law, seems to be
at a turning point. The field appears to be bifurcating. One branch has fallen back
on traditional doctrinal scholarship, still cosmopolitan and liberal/progressive, but
with a chastened tone. The other branch is devoted to quantitative empiricism and
is beginning to inform questions of treaty design. Old habits die hard, but we put
our money on the second branch producing more wisdom than the first.
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